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Relation to the Good as a Key Element in Ethical Maturity and Conscientiousness

Charles Taylor takes the opportunity to fill out the picture/ecology of the moral self in more detail and to propose a vital relationship with the good as part of moral self-constitution. This addresses some of the dark implications of Foucault’s work on identity. Taylor’s analysis of morality is tightly interwoven with his analysis of the self in Western culture and that is very helpful as a critique of Foucault: Taylor (1989, 3) argues that the human self is an inherently moral entity; self is always situated in moral space: “Selfhood and the good … or selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes.” He does not settle for the self as a work of art, inventor or self, or artist of self. He wants more.

The moral ontology proposed by Taylor sets up a lively tension and contrast with Foucault; it challenges at points, it reveals what is hidden beneath the surface at other points, and it shows what is left out of the doctrine of aesthetic-freedom. Such a doctrine has become an ideology in today’s academic culture. This dialogue is deemed fruitful because there are insights to be gained by comparing and contrasting a more simple and minimalist ontology with a broader, richer, and more complex one. There is beauty in the simplicity of Foucault, of course, but there are serious problems of anti-humanism and potential for implosion into nihilism. Taylor’s discourse is a good route to comprehending/resolving Foucault’s skewed concept of freedom in context of a larger whole. Taylor is fair in raising some good questions on the one hand, and highlighting the insights of Foucault on the other. It is an important contribution to the current debate about identity. I begin with Taylor’s case for moral realism. 

Taylor’s argument for moral realism is five-fold. In terms of moral givens, he argues that certain perennial features of the self are present irrespective of culture or the way they are expressed or understood. He starts his analysis with the question of how humans operate as moral beings in their actual moral experiences in daily life, and with their reflection upon those experiences. So like Foucault, he is interested in praxis as well as theory. Beginning with humans and the way they experience morality, he claims that the most plausible explanation of morality is one that takes seriously the human perception of the independence of goods–we have an objective and subjective relationship with the moral good. He does not want to substitute a philosophical abstraction for how people live and think.

Firstly, he argues for the ubiquity of moral intuitions and judgments in human experience. We can all agree to this phenomenon. These are intuitions that transcend basic human desires for survival, sex, or self-realization. They are also referred to as second-order desires, strong evaluations or qualitative discriminations. All these terms are employed by Taylor. Note the important reference to the ‘quality of the will’. This concept of second-order desires appeals to the ancient idea of the good. Although interwoven with the self, it transcends the self in significant ways.

Secondly, he argues that there is a need for a larger moral picture to facilitate the task of making sense of moral experience (debates, deliberations, decisions, and actions). He calls this picture (map) a moral framework or horizon. Each framework is made up of several goods held together in a coherent relationship with one another, producing a moral worldview or social imaginary. The moral self is in a dialectical relationship with its framework; this is not a static set of conditions.

Thirdly, he recognizes that there is a key defining good within each moral framework, which he calls the hypergood. The hypergood is the highest/most important good and operates a controlling influence over the other goods within the framework. It defines the overall character of the framework and thus is central to the discussion of the moral self.

Fourthly, Taylor recognizes a narrative and communal texture to the pursuit of the good in moral self-constitution. Humans interpret their lives in narrative and communal terms as they pursue moral goods. This narrative articulation helps the individual to find a unity/continuity amidst the complexity of moral experience and a plurality of goods vying for one’s attention. This is key to making moral sense of life experience. It is also part of the quest of one’s life.

Fifthly, Taylor speaks of the sources of the moral, which he refers to as the constitutive good. The constitutive good (a category of moral motivation) gives meaning to and empowers the hypergood and the other life goods within the moral framework. It provides the constitutive ground of worth or value of the life goods, and empowers the self to live the good life. This is a very significant dimension that is often missed in moral deliberation.

Therefore, moral/spiritual identity is intimately interwoven with the pursuit of the good in Taylor’s ontology. This is essential to meaning and purpose. He discerns these five categories as basic givens, structural features that are common to the life of all morally healthy human beings. Taylor wants to problematize the occlusion or exclusion of such parameters, such qualitative distinctions for moral reasoning. He believes that within the life of the individual, there is a multiplicity of goods to be recognized, acted upon, and pursued. Taylor emphasizes the importance of being circumspect about these very significant goods. It entails a moral ontology of the self at its best, or most whole. It was not developed by Taylor specifically for a response to Foucault, but offers a useful framework for this dialogue on moral self-constitution. 

As a nominalist and anti-essentialist, Foucault has suggested that there is no objective, stable human moral nature either independent of culture or one’s historical formation, or alternatively independent of one’s own private self-construction. Therefore, on his view, the constructing forces of society and government are in tension with the constructing force of the individual self. This is the battle line for identity formation. Culture tends to determine the meaning one assigns to the world around, and what one takes as human and natural. Therefore, what is often called human nature is very temporary, contingent, local, and changeable. The quest for freedom means that change is necessary; every self is involved in the process of defining and shaping itself. In Foucault’s mind, there is no universal human nature other than either the ability to acquire a culture from society or the nature individuals construct themselves. Moral selves are either a cultural product or a self-made product, or perhaps some combination of the two. 

Foucault’s moral ontology of aesthetic-freedom entails a whole meta-position of relativism, multiplicity, difference, and diversity. We should not miss that it too is an ideology. It is one that excludes the moral good as defined by Taylor drawing on a historic understanding going back to the Greeks. For Foucault, there exists no ultimate or final moral position or common set of moral parameters, which is to be seen as hierarchically justified. In this, he agrees with many of his fellow late moderns. Attempts at claiming such justification would be seen by him as a fatal flaw. His relativist moral position means that he does not believe that it is possible to argue rationally for the superiority of one moral construction over another. We have said that this can lead to chaos, anti-humanism, or nihilism.

There is no totalizing or final position because that would be to court vulnerability to domination. All positions, according to Foucault, are seen as problematic and dangerous, implicated with power, regime-biased. Ethics, in his sense, is history all the way down or a historical-cultural predisposition or bias, and therefore must be constantly put under the critical knife. Moral self-constitution changes from place to place and era to era, and ultimately individual to individual. The moral vision he offers in an age of moral crisis and nihilism (loss of moral consensus) is that the self might gain increased control over self-construction and escape dominating power strategies. This tool can be of some help and provide a basis for dialogue with Taylor’s dynamic grappling with the good. For Foucault, the creativity and originality of self is the road to freedom from domination. It is clear by now that he does not offer hope for society as a whole in his ethics–no mutual or common good. Freedom has an individual shape and it is a contest, a struggle. Perhaps he has in mind the image of the Greek Olympic Games. One must assertively and proactively manage one’s own identity. This sets the stage for debate on moral ontology as it relates to the self. 

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 

Watkin, C. (2018). Michel Foucault. Philipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing.