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What is a Moral Horizon?

As you follow this series, you will realize that mature, healthy freedom is not merely liberty to do whatever you want. It involves responsibility for the impact of your actions on others and on creation/the natural world. Once the case is made for qualitative discriminations, Taylor continues to develop the case for moral realism by arguing that one has to make sense of these basic human moral intuitions within some structure. This means that one has to articulate self within a moral framework, in a way that makes sense of that experience. The various goods that vie for attention need to be organized within a defined moral worldview, a big picture of moral thought and action. This process involves the geography metaphor of moral mapping of a landscape, making explicit the existence within the self of a map which can describe, contextualize, and guide one’s moral experience and judgments; it includes a set of moral parameters. Taylor believes that this is very significant for healthy moral consciousness. He sees that this moral horizon is an essential dimension of the self’s moral reality, claiming that all people have such a framework, even if it exists in a fragile state, or if they are entirely unconscious of it. The self is interconnected in dialectical relationship with such a horizon. Inherent in this discourse is a call to a higher version of freedom. Taylor writes:

 I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without moral frameworks is utterly impossible for us; otherwise put, that the horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative discriminations. Moreover, this is not meant just as a contingently true psychological fact about human beings … Rather the claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood. (C. Taylor, 1989, 27) 

He comments on the crisis that emerges with the loss of such a horizon as a disorientation of self, the kind of phenomenon that is endemic to nihilism (C. Taylor, 1989, 18-19). He notes that to begin to lose one’s orientation is to be in crisis—both a moral and identity crisis at once—and to lose it utterly is to break down and enter a zone of extreme pathology (C. Taylor, 1989, 27-28). Employing the metaphor of physical space, Taylor claims that the framework orients the self in moral space, a space of moral questions of purpose, conduct, and direction. One’s moral horizon is composed of a series of qualitative discriminations (spoken of in post 2/ in this series), strong evaluations, or judgments about which goods are of higher importance. The moral horizon automatically invokes a hierarchy of goods; it offers structure and guidance concerning how to relate to others, what it is good to be, and what is meaningful, important and rewarding, what one endorses and opposes. Some may lack this orientation, but it is not taken as a situation to be normalized or celebrated as a boon of freedom. Actually, it shows us concern for that individual’s moral and mental health, as a form of confusion. It exhibits a crisis of self.

The qualitative nature of the framework reads as follows:

To think, feel, judge within such a framework is to function with a sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is incomparably higher than the others … available to us. Higher means deeper, purer, fuller, more admirable, making an absolute claim …. Higher goods command our respect, awe, admiration—act as a standard. (C. Taylor, 1989, 19-20) 

This reference to incomparably higher speaks of the hypergood, an important aspect of the framework. This topic will be covered in the next post. The framework or horizon is one’s ultimate claim about the nature and contours of the moral world. It is the moral home in which we dwell. It is not held lightly or casually, but taken as real (as one’s moral ontology); it is essential to understanding oneself and one’s human world. Can freedom itself offer such a moral ontology? Let’s see as we examine to parameters of our framework. Importantly, one’s moral map transcends the self, is greater and higher than the self. Examples of such frameworks are found in a theistic religion like Judaism but also in secular viewpoints such as Scientism, Marxism or New Age. Nihilism denies that such a frame exists. One’s horizon contains a disciplined, life-shaping worldview. One’s identity lives in a dynamic relationship with, it is moved deeply–captivated by such a framework. The horizon is composed of strongly-affirmed goods. Inherently, there is a personal resonance of these goods with the self. One’s horizon offers a place to locate the self, and set one’s moral priorities, and build out from there in character and the goal trajectory of one’s life. Taylor takes note of this important distinction about the development of identity. 

My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose … the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand (C. Taylor, 1989, 27). If the human is a self-interpreting animal [both Foucault and Taylor affirm this], the moral framework is deeply endemic to one’s self-interpretation (Taylor, 1989, pp. 34-36). 

In terms of nuances, we learn that there are different moral horizons, different maps, for different people and groups. Taylor recognizes that the orientation in moral space of an anarchist is quite different from that of a Catholic or a feminist. In fact, one could say that various people live in different moral universes: operating with radically different assumptions, drives and concerns (a fundamental insight). Charles Taylor considers that it is quite positive to articulate these differences, rather than hide them philosophically, because it can works towards better understanding as in negotiation between different countries. Dialogue and communication is productive. According to our philosopher, the relationship with one’s framework is dialectical–i.e., the framework is not static. Contrary to Foucault’s assumption, such a framework is not simply something imposed by society, parents, or a ruling elite–part of a power/knowledge regime. It is chosen by adults with clear minds.

Spiritual Quest: I have learned much from Taylor about the link or interface between morality and spirituality. He firmly believes and demonstrates that one’s moral framework also includes a personal spiritual quest or narrative journey (C. Taylor, 1989, 17-18). It is something that is both invented and discovered at once “in virtue of which we make sense of our lives spiritually” (C. Taylor, 1989, 18). It also refers to the search for and discovery of one’s moral calling. The quest is to find a fit for one’s reflective moral experience, and discovering this fit depends on, is interwoven with inventing it. That is complex but very insightful regarding mature freedom. Making sense of life involves framing meaningful expressions which are adequate and carry moral substance and currency (C. Taylor, 1989, 18). Humans are creatively involved in the development and shaping of their moral horizon as they grow and mature. Taylor agrees with Foucault regarding this creative dimension of self-shaping autonomy. 

Taylor uses the term articulate for the process whereby the aspects of the moral world are identified, clarified, and made accessible, so that they can empower moral agents (C. Taylor, 1989, 18). To articulate is in a sense to draw the background picture which makes sense of one’s life morally speaking. It offers to locate the good vis-à-vis the self, and to specify the dynamics of how I am related to the good. He suggests that the self naturally has an urge to articulate (make explicit) this background picture (moral map). It can be a very liberating experience. The articulation produces an awareness of something that is unspoken but presupposed: the tacit becomes explicit. This process reveals itself, especially when there is a moral challenge to one’s framework by another person of significance in one’s life. It can also be triggered by a moral dilemma or a challenging circumstance as in suffering a loss or tragedy. This elicits the ideals that draw the self to a particular moral outlook, empowers the self, and inspires a person to act in accord with their emerging framework. It is also important to realize that one can adopt new goods into one’s moral framework as these are deemed valuable in the process of one’s quest for moral growth throughout one’s life. Human rights language can come later in one’s life and still have a very positive impact.

The Benefits of Articulation:

(a) It deepens one’s understanding of moral goods and responses by showing what underpins them. The process backgrounds and contextualizes the moral self, thought, and action. It helps us break out of our current moral autism where performance and productivity has replaced moral validation (Matthew Crawford, The World Beyond Your Head, 183-85). This can help with what ails modernity.

(b) It heightens and sharpens one’s consciousness/awareness of the complexity of the moral life and the diverse range of goods to which modern individuals adhere. This can be surprising, as it shows us what drives our friend or colleague.

(c) It enhances the rational discussion and evaluation of goods because they are brought to the surface of consciousness. This is one place where Taylor’s moral ontology really stands out: importantly, he believes in the possibility of rational discussion of ethical ideals and convictions. They are not strictly or rightly a private affair. People deserve to know where we are coming from, to avoid manipulation.

If articulacy is to open us, to bring us out of the cramped postures of suppression, this is partly because it will allow us to acknowledge the full range of goods we live by. It is also because it will open us to our moral sources, to release their force in our lives. (Taylor, 1989, 107) 

(d) Finally, articulation provides a correction to the “self-enforced inarticulacy” (C. Taylor, 1989, 53-90) of much modern moral philosophy with respect to these qualitative discriminations. Taylor (C. Taylor, 1989, 84, 90) disagrees with those who want to obscure these frameworks or remain mute about the place of qualitative distinctions in the moral life. That seems quite ingenuous or dishonest, as pragmatic concerns alone are insufficient for human flourishing. It also helps them to seek foundations or sources for their moral convictions, to discern which are shallow and selfish and which are of substance and have longterm applicability.

Martin Luther King Jr. said, “The moral arc of the universe is long, but it tends towards justice.”

Throughout his discussion about frameworks, Taylor recovers/revives an interest in a commitment to the good. In his understanding, development of identity emerges in a way that is closely linked to one’s orientation within a particular moral framework or horizon, that is, where one is positioned with respect to one’s moral map, plus the goods within one’s horizon. This is the defining edge of meaning in one’s life; he claims that a person with depth (a thick self) must be defined in terms of the good: “In order to make minimal sense of our lives, in order to have an identity, we need an orientation to the good, which means some sense of qualitative discrimination, of the incomparably higher” (Taylor, 1989, p. 47). What one calls the good is the most significant defining factor: “What I am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for me and how I orient myself to the good” (C. Taylor, 1989, 34). Genuine self-understanding, clarification, moral self-discipline, and education require that the self be identified and articulated within such a moral horizon. It also means that, “one orients oneself in a space which exists independently of one’s success or failure in finding one’s bearings” (C. Taylor, 1989, 30). Good mentorship is often needed to work things through. One is able to grow up into one’s framework and get over intimidation by its complexity and demand. This adds another dimension to the objective pole in his moral ontology: the moral horizon has a status independent of the self, though intimately and dialectically entwined with the self. 

Discerning Between Differing Horizons: There is another important distinction in Taylor’s proposal. He identifies the existence of many different and conflicting horizons that frame an individual’s moral space. Is he merely proposing another sophisticated form of relativism, one of moral frameworks? In this regard, he does clarify an important qualifier about frameworks in a response to critical papers on his work, Philosophy in An Age of Pluralism (J. Tully, Ed., 1994). He strongly denies the arbitrariness of one’s framework, or the equality of all frameworks, in favour of a more critical and thoughtful perspective, where some frameworks actually calculate as being of higher value than others. This is essential to his critical moral realism:

Realism involves ranking (some) schemes and ranking them in terms of their ability to cope with, allow us to know, describe, come to understand reality. Some schemes are better or worse than others …. Moral realism requires one be able to identify certain moral changes as gains or losses, yet it can be sensitive to the complexities of life and of moral choice. (C. Taylor, 1994, 220 and 224) 

This is not exactly the same as scientific critical realism (although there is some overlap) where the forces of nature operate in a certain way whether humans observe them in that way or not, and where the scientist bends her analysis or theory to fit newly discovered data sets from research. The moral goods do not exist actually outside of the human realm; it is human beings only that see significance in a moral good and a particular moral framework–Taylor’s concept of resonance. Moral realism means that some frameworks are truer to authentic human experience and make more sense than others, that is, that they are more plausible, and nobler. This remains an important nuance in his discourse. 

From the average person’s perspective, there are no final criteria for evaluating or judging between different frameworks, except to transparently reveal what they actually claim. Frameworks are evaluated rationally by their highest ideals—hypergoods—and by their personal resonance with the self (sense of fitness). They are deeply connected to one’s self-interpretation, one’s sense of self in the relationship to others. Taylor puts forward an honest appraisal of the actual situation, a critique of the superficial notion of soft relativism.

The point of view from which we might constate that all orders are equally arbitrary, in particular that all moral views are equally so, is just not available to us as humans. It is a form of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a moral orientation which we take to be right. That is a condition of being a functioning self, not a metaphysical view we can put on or off. (C. Taylor, 1989, 99) 

Significantly, it is not possible for anyone to hold a position where all horizons are created equal, or to hold one’s moral horizon lightly or superficially, because it shapes one’s very identity; it is a serious matter, one with gravitas.

Taylor does offer hope that when one could become dissatisfied with one’s horizon, and that there is a way forward of searching/working through it to a better alternative. This is the way of error reduction or filling the gaps within one’s view. He also emphasizes that one must be able to live consistently and non-ambivalently within one’s horizon: It must have liveability. This is the direction of increased plausibility or resonance. Both subjective and objective dimensions are recognized together in his ethics. Therefore, one can engage in intelligent rational dialogue about horizons, and even across horizons. Horizons are to be respected and not to be feared or shunned as a mere ploy of controlling forces. 

Application: It is highly documented that humans are susceptible to corruption. Sometimes they lack discernment between right and wrong, good and evil. Taylor is no moral relativist as I have argued above. I believe that he would agree with French philosopher Chantal Delsol in her book, Icarus Fallen, that even though Europeans have been shy about language of the good since World War 2, they do want to discern between Good and Evil. I take this definition from my recent publication, Towards an Incarnational Spiritual Culture (G. Carkner, 2024, 83-84). It can be applied to social justice and harmony across difference–towards societal renewal.

Delsol’s Definition of Evil: The Greek concept of diabolos literally means “he who separates,” he who divides through aversion and hate; he who makes unjust accusations, denigrates, slanders; he who envies, admits his repugnancy. The absolute Evil identified by our contemporaries takes the form of racism, exclusion or totalitarianism. The last in fact appears to be the epitome of separation, since it atomizes societies, functions by means of terror and denouncement, and is determined to destroy human bonds. Apartheid and xenophobia of all varieties are champions of separation. This features the Machiavellian psychological profile.

Delsol’s Definition of the Good: For contemporary man, the notions of solidarity and fraternity, and the different expressions of harmony between classes, age groups, and peoples, are still associated with goodness. The man of our time is similar to the man of any time insofar as he prefers friendship to hate and indifference, social harmony to internal strife, peace to war, and the united family to the fragmented family. In other words, he seeks relationship, union, agreement, and love, and fears distrust, ostracism, contempt, and the destruction of his fellow men. . . . The good has the face of fellowship, no matter what name it is given, be it love, the god of Aristotle, or the God of the Bible.

The certitude of the good finds its guarantee in the attraction it induces. The separation of the diabolos occurs constantly, but one day or another it will be pursued by mortal shame. Thus, progression in areas like human rights moves towards the good of all: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YyHiUGdWdFc Human Rights in 2066 William Shabas; You Are a Human Rights Person https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oG2M05Bd2PU

—Since the time of Paul, Christian thought had been directed to the status and claims of humans as such, quite apart from the roles that they might occupy in a particular society. It is hardly too much to say that Paul’s conception of deity provided the individual with a freehold in reality. It laid a normative foundation for individual conscience and its claims. (L. Siedentop, The Invention of the Individual, 152)

Dr. Gordon E. Carkner PhD Philosophical Theology, University of Wales, Author, Blogger, YouTube Webinar Producer, Meta-Educator UBC Potgraduate Students & Faculty

New Book by Charles Taylor:  Cosmic Connections: Poetry in the Age of Disenchantment

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 

Delsol, Chantal. Icarus Fallen: The Search for Meaning in an Uncertain World. Translated by Robin Dick. Wilmington, DE: ISIS, 2003

Carkner, G. (2024). Towards an Incarnational Spiritual Culture: Grounding our Identity in Christ. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishing.

Tully, J. (Ed.) (1994) Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.