Proposition Three: Redeemed freedom flourishes within a transcendent trinitarian horizon. Trinitarian divine goodness proves to be a fruitful plausibility structure within which to think differently about freedom and the moral self. Trinitarian goodness-freedom answers some of the concerns in the Foucauldian self and reveals new opportunities for identity, discovery, transformation and exploration. It also adds sophistication and meaning to some of Taylor’s categories without offering the final answer on the discussion. It is in the life of Jesus as a member of the Trinity that one can visualize this goodness-freedom dynamic most dramatically. This holds dramatic implications for moral discourse.
Foucault (1984e, p. 4) claims that, ‘Ethics is the deliberate form assumed by freedom.’ But what kind of form in our freedom will endure and flourish? What is the impact of a transcendent paradigm in this conversation and how does it help to interpret and discern the constitution of the moral self? The language of strong transcendence implies a transcendence which resides outside the economies of human experience, and human culture spheres of science, art, religion and ethics, and yet it plays a key role in the drama of self-constitution. It offers a significant contribution to the validation, affirmation, and recognition of the self from a larger horizon of significance, creating a whole new range of possibilities. It also occasions a standpoint for an evaluation of beliefs and practices, offering a subject position from which to protest the unexamined hegemony of the aesthetic present in Foucault’s hermeneutics of the moral self. This hegemony, along with the hegemony of science, is resisted through an exploration of the horizons of the good, moving the self beyond Foucault’s limitations and beyond the hegemony of scientism. It reaches for something higher and deeper, more meaningful.
The discussion of recovering ethics and freedom of a higher quality as a partnership with trinitarian relationality is highlighted in Jesus. He offers an example of redeemed human freedom, through the cooperation between divine goodness and human freedom, effecting and empowerment of human freedom. In earlier posts, the human good was linked through a transcendent turn to trinitarian goodness. At this juncture, it will be fruitful to explore the marriage of the good (transcendently rooted and qualified) and freedom. Jesus’ life constitutes the reconciliation of, rather than the enmity between, goodness and freedom. Transcendent goodness energizes and impacts his expression of freedom. In the philosophical turn towards transcendent goodness, freedom as an ontology is subverted by the ontology of agape love, or divine trinitarian goodness. Foucault resists this sense of strong transcendence in his ethics of the disenchanted self, and his project risks falling back into nihilism. His ethical thought is focused through the culture sphere of art (in resistance against the preceding cultural hegemonies of science and religion). Aesthetics is given a controlling position over the other culture spheres. It is an arts of rebellion and self-assertiveness.
But does Foucault miss something significant in his analysis of Christian technologies of the self and is it not a bit one-sided? How does Jesus’ life interpret freedom differently in the light of this suggested turn to transcendent goodness? How does it deal with Foucault’s claim to radical autonomy for the self? The interpretation starts as trinitarian theonomous goodness-freedom, a God-related freedom, that is qualified by transcendent divine goodness (D. Stephen Long, The Goodness of God).
It begins with the living God of the Christian story, who is constituted by a form of relation, mutuality and reciprocity in which freedom is given to that which is Other—other Persons in the Trinity and the creational Other, humans. The Christian Trinity is a tri-unity of Persons with a history of self-giving freedom that defines God’s being as agape love, and the moral source and inspiration for human finite goodness. Human goodness participates in, but is not identical with, nor does it reach the quality of divine goodness. Jesus is a form and expression of trinitarian goodness in human society, a robust example of this goodness-freedom. The studied avoidance of Jesus’ exemplum in ethics accorded by Foucault’s critique of Christian moral self-constitution is an unfortunate oversight. It skews the conversation quite inappropriately. Read More…











